Over the recent months, a momentum has begun to build aroundthe idea of focusing a world-wide campaign against the prime typesof weapons that are killing and maiming people in conflict andpost-conflict regions.
This embryonic campaign, now a collaboration between governments,NGOs and IGOs, is exciting because it stems more from the humanitarianaction and health communities than it does from the disarmamentsector. The focus of the campaign is on what is needed ratherthan what is thought to be politically possible.
We have written this discussion paper in order to assist andthe growing debate on military-style weapons. There is a strongurgency associated with this process. While we dither people aredying and being in injured in large numbers. Societies are beingdestroyed and futures are being ruined. We realise that a seriouscampaign could well use the 2001 small arms conference as itsspringboard and urge that action is taken before then to ensuremaximum support for this process.
This draft paper is intended for researchers and policy-formersworking in the fields of conflict prevention resolution, humanitarianaid, refugee aid, emergency health, disaster prevention, development,post-conflict building, arms control and so on. We hope that itwill stimulate discussion and we would like feedback before 31October 2000. Please feel free to circulate this paper on an informalbasis, but please do not cite it in its draft form or quote fromit as it now stands. We think it likely that the paper will beextensively modified before it is published and we look forwardto receiving your comments (plewis@unog.ch and ccarle @unog.ch).
The problem
Of all of the small arms that are killing and maiming people throughoutthe world, military and military-style automatic weapons are asterrible as landmines in their devastating effects. Like landmines,their destructive power far outlasts the conflicts they were originallydesigned to fight.
These weapons are made for war. They have been designed tobe used by trained military personnel. However they have spreadwell beyond their intended clientele, into the hands of the illicitarms traders. Their abundance and firepower can exacerbate violentconflict, prolong the fighting, increase the participation ofcivilians and make conflict resolution even more difficult.
This is a humanitarian issue of the first order. Bringing tobear a humanitarian/human rights focus on the small arms effortsin the international arena ¾ and thus concentrating onthe spread, use and individual solutions to the problem of militarystyle weapons in civilian hands ¾ may succeed in removingone of the most deadly threats to people in the world today.
The legacy of military style weapons is seen on the streetsof countries in Africa, Latin America, South Asia, Central Asia,Europe, the Middle East and South East Asia where they can prolongconflicts, and propagate the interests of organized and opportunisticcriminals. In other regions, such as North America, Western Europeor Oceania, their widespread availability has landed them ontothe streets of cities to serve the purposes of organized crimeand the drug barons. In some cases they have found their way intothe hands of unstable individuals with tragic consequences. Theyhave played a central role in destabilising civil law and orderwhere its grip is often tenuous.
They are used in small and large-scale conflicts throughoutthe world. They include arms such as Kalashnikovs, G-3s, M-16sand FN FALs. What makes them so dangerous is that they are highlydestructive, with a rapid rate of fire, powerful, easy to use,inexpensive and in abundance. For example, it is estimated thatmore than 70 million assault rifles have been produced since WorldWar II and used in well over 90 countries
Their ease of use and widespread availability makes it morelikely that civilians will be drawn into war-fighting. This isparticularly true for young people because these weapons requirevery little skill and training to use and their small size meansthat they can be carried and used even by children.
Following a conflict, a number of paths lie open to the spreadof civilian-held military-style weapons:
Such weapons distort societies, they make it increasingly difficultfor a society to rebuild itself following a period of bloody conflict,they make it harder for the State to regain the legitimate monopolyof force, they enhance the capabilities of criminals, thus compromisingthe effectiveness of police forces and encouraging law-abidingcivilians to arm themselves for protection, they lower the thresholdfor violence and they are very easy for children to obtain anduse.
Military-style weapons are a threat to people in war-ravagedsocieties. When they remain in the hands of ex-combatants followinga conflict they continue to keep the violence-threshold low andincrease the likelihood of a return to full-scale violence, thusperpetuating conflicts.
Not only do these weapons find their way into conflict zonesand into the hands of civilian combatants, but they also turnup in weak or failed states, in states with permissive legislation(where they can be legally-held) or poorly-enforced legislationand in states with paramilitary forces, terrorist groups and uncontrolledreserve militia.
The presence of military-style weapons in the hands of civiliansnot only has an impact in terms of the direct humanitarian effects(deaths, terrible injuries, long-term disabilities and so on)but this situation can severely undermine the delivery of humanitarianassistance in conflict zones and in refugee camps by compromisingthe security of personnel who are working in vital humanitarianassistance.
They are transferred through both licit and illicit means,through brokers, through the illegal sale of legal military equipmentby the armed forces, police and corrupt officials. Once in theillegal market they can be bought at very low prices or they arestolen ¾ such crimes going unreported. Primarily, theyare bought or stolen because of a perceived need - a need to fightor protect, a need to gain status, provide food and security,a need to dominate in the face of scarce resources.
Solutions
This is such a complex and widespread problem that there is noone solution or approach. There have to be regional, subregional,national, unilateral, multilateral, bilateral, global approachesworking in tandem in the hope of making some dent in the problem.
It has to be acknowledged at the outset that none of theseapproaches can be fool-proof or leak-proof. Most solutions tothese problems can only be significant in the long run, and successwill vary according to context, but fewer people will die, fewerpeople will be maimed and, where conflict-prevention fails, societieswill more easily rebuild themselves after violent conflicts.
1. Banning sales to non-State actors?
One solution would be to have national, international and regionalagreements or codes-of-conduct on selling military weapons toregular armed forces only.
The big problem with this idea is that there are sometimesstrong reasons for non-state actors to require such weapons inorder, for example, to overthrow an illegitimate, cruel and corruptgovernment when non-violent means have been exhausted etc. Inaddition, there are many concerns as to who would impose suchbans and who would monitor them.
There are arguments, however, that such concerns are over-emphasised.Certainly, with a handful of significant exceptions, violent overthrowsof corrupt regimes often end up with equally corrupt and inhumanesuccessor regimes. Non-violent pressure is often far more successfulin achieving the long-term progress of a country than armed struggle.In addition, the atrocities committed by paramilitaries, particularlythose that have recruited children as combatants, have been sohorrific that curbs on sales of military weapons to non-stateactors may have to be considered as one of the approaches to betaken, with some provision for an exemption clause depending onagreement within the international community.
2. Breaking the chain
Destroying surplus weapons and stockpile management
Dealing with surplus weapons has two main aspects. The firstis for governments to destroy weapons deemed obsolete or in excessto national needs, rather than sell them. This may not alwaysbe easy, particularly in countries in which governments themselvesdo not keep precise accounts of their own inventories or in countrieswhere sales or surplus weapons are used to fund purchase of newweapons. Some countries may also lack the means for effectiveand environmentally friendly means of destroying surplus weaponsand their associated ammunition. Both inventories and destructiontechniques and equipment may sometimes require the provision ofspecialised assistance from states and companies (often the majorarms manufacturers themselves) with more experience in these matters.This applies particularly to ammunition. However, for the weaponsthemselves, simple destruction by crushing and burning by localfactories and foundries may well suffice. Indeed, experience showsthat the political process of obtaining agreement to begin a weapons-collectionprogramme and the organization of the programme itself is themost difficult part. However, a weapons collection programme thatdoesn't include a destruction phase, is vulnerable to becominga focal point for the illicit redistribution of the weapons oncecollected.
The only way of ensuring that military small arms do not fallinto the wrong hands is to make sure that they are securely heldand accounted for by legitimate state authorities, and betterstill, that they are destroyed if and when the state no longerrequires them. International or regional standards and regulationscould be developed to assist in proper stockpile management. SouthAfrica's initiative to destroy its redundant stockpile of weapons,and the assistance provided by Norway to that end, are recentexperiences from which lessons and inspiration should be derivedin other national and regional settings.
The second aspect is more difficult. It would involve the moppingup of automatic weapons currently in the hands of civilians, asa prelude to their destruction. Cash for weapons is an optionthat raises well-known problems. Weapons for goods and services,in particular "weapons for development" seem more promising.Such an approach requires the collective approval of a community,individuals are not rewarded ¾ rather the village or regionobtains something for the collective good. Those handing in theweapons are then seen as contributing to the community, whereasbefore they may have been seen as people bringing terror and crimeinto the area. This option presupposes an accurate identificationof genuine and practical development needs in order to offer usefuland attractive incentives for civilians to hand in their weaponsand that these needs will contribute to genuinely permanent solutions.Above all, it also presupposes the ability of the State to provideadequate protection for civilians and for the development projectsthemselves.
National, regional and international attempts to increase transparencyand to develop transnational systems for tracing military styleweapons transfers, along with legal measures to prohibit civilianpossession could be developed. Multilateral, bilateral and unilateralmeasures could all work in parallel on the different regionallevels, depending on the requirements of the varying situations.
3. Brokering
Brokers trading in weapons, as they would in any other commodities,commonly act as legal and illegal purveyors of small arms to regions,countries and factions in conflict. Customers desperate for weaponscan be expected to pay a premium for arms provided in this way.Such brokering is unregulated and difficult to trace because mostcountries lack legislation covering such activities by their ownnationals, and because fake documentation (especially end-usercertificates) is easily obtained from corruptible officials. Transactionstypically involve several countries as transit points both forthe weapons and for funds, without the weapons transiting throughthe country from which the broker operates.
Adequate national legislation should require the registrationand licensing of brokers, whether operating from their own countryor from abroad. This will require international cooperation andinformation exchange. They should be held responsible for anyunlicensed activity, or for contravening export-control laws andinternational embargoes. Such strictures should apply equallyto brokering in weapons and in ammunition. The development ofan international agreement to increase transparency and to regulatethe activities of arms brokers, agents and transport companies,could be seriously considered - ¾ including the concernsver the use of brokers by governments in order to cover-up illegalsales.
4. Ammunition control
The 7.62 or 5.56 calibre ammunition for military-style automaticrifles is widely produced and traded. In conflict situations,it is used in large quantities. Regulating its supply from bothdomestic and foreign suppliers could therefore assist in reducingthe incidence of violence and the duration and destructivenessof conflicts. Where weapons are widespread and offer no immediatehope for successful mopping up, and where combatants require resuppliesin ammunition, restricting ammunition supplies can be the onlysignificant option. Reducing the ease with which ammunition canbe acquired can also make it less attractive for former combatantsand civilians to retain their weapons in post-conflict situations.As with the weapons themselves, legal governmental stockpilesof ammunition need to be properly managed and accounted for soas to increase the legitimate control of stocks. Ammunition stocksneed to be regularly monitored and surplus and obsolete alongwith unusable and unstable stocks need to be destroyed ratherthen sold off.
5. Civil society campaign
One of the great difficulties with the debates around controllingsmall arms and light weapons is the large numbers of legal, about-to-become-illegaland illegal weapons in circulation and the complexities involvedthat are raised by increased availability ¾ not least ofwhich is the often understandable need for such weapons in a numberof situations. This has made it easy for opponents of small armscontrol in any form to knock down initiatives and ideas as quicklyas they spring up. It has also meant that it has been hard tofind a collective focus for a civil society-based campaign onthe issue, with NGOs working on a myriad of scattered initiatives,and often seeming to be running around in circles.
In addition, it has proved extraordinarily difficult to gatherreliable data on the types and quantities of small arms that arein existence and that are doing the damage.
However, both from quantitative research and strong anecdotalevidence, there is clearly a major problem with military weaponsin the hands of civilians as outlined above.
If a concerted campaign were to be formed to remove such weaponsfrom civilian hands this would have a number of distinct advantages:
Conclusion
The time seems to be ripe for a different approach to smallarms control. This approach should be focused on the weapons thatare doing most harm to people and their security. Efforts in smallarms control, such as marking, tracking, ammunition control, productioncontrol could all form part of this approach, but only as partof a bigger whole, driven by humanitarian needs. Such effortsthen would no longer be perceived as tinkering at the edges ofthe problem, rather their efficacy could be determined in thelight of the larger goal. Tackling civilian-held, military-styleweapons may provide an approach that could strike to the heartof the problem, obtain global and regional support, provide afocus for governmental and non-governmental action and achievelasting good.
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Last updated: 30 January 2001